What is history?
I ask this question every time I begin teaching historiography, not because I think there is an answer but to determine if the students think that there is one. If, by the end of the class, they report that they thought they knew what history is but have become completely confused, then I feel that I have done my job well. To claim to have pinned history down with certitude would likely involve complacency, arrogance, reductionism, or some combination of the three. I would like to believe that I am neither complacent, arrogant nor reductionist; however, my failure to come up with a conclusive definition of history is not proof of that.
Perhaps it is easier to begin by identifying what history is not. It is not objective truth with either a lower or upper case “T.” It does not repeat itself. It is not a science and, contrary to what the German philologist and historian Leopold von Ranke asserted, it does not “show what really happened.” The facts do not speak for themselves. Rather, historians piece together incomplete, often opaque, fragments of the human past in an attempt to make that past intelligible to their present. In so doing, history says as much, if not more, about the concerns of the individual historian than the past.
One response to the reality of historical contingency and/or relativism has been to reduce it to its simplest terms. For Herodotus, history simply meant “inquiry.” Carl Becker simplified history as “the memory of things said and done.” The British philosopher of history, C. G. Collingwood maintained it was simply “thought about thought,” the relationship between thought and its object. These statements are so simple that it is difficult to argue with them. However, they all suggest history’s inherently subjective nature.
Does subjectivity invalidate historical inquiry? One student cogently posed the following challenge to the discipline. He argued that historians still maintain the fiction that some degree of objectivity is possible in historical writing. However, we are deluding ourselves: “objectivity” is really no more than a consensus of subjectivities, or as he phrased it “an orgy of subjectivities.” The idea of “rationality” is also subjectively constructed. Therefore, historians should abandon any claims to being a social science or rational form of inquiry. History thus becomes a form of fiction, no less and no more.
This critique, pursued to its logical conclusion, could apply to many other branches of human inquiry as well, particularly those that style themselves as “scientific.” Does subjectivity preclude us from investigating the human past? I say, “ no.” I believe that human beings order their existence historically (borrowing again from Carl Becker’s commonsensical approach), that much of our identity is constructed in relation to our idea of the past (real or imagined), and that we are inescapably subjective. We cannot fully know the bases of our subjectivity but by writing about the present or about the past through the eyes of the present, people in the future may be able to discern, however dimly, what gave our lives meaning. So maybe we are writing for the future, not in an obvious and futile attempt to “learn from the past” or avoid its “ mistakes,” but to provide idiosyncratic, particularistic suggestions about how we searched for meaning in the human past.
On a lighter note, piecing together a narrative version of the human past by using disparate bits of physical evidence that have been preserved is a lot of fun. If you can present your interpretation artfully, all the better. And there’s a certain voyeuristic thrill to be had by prying into the past of people who are no longer around to defend themselves.